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PREFACE 
Thls paper is one in a series of reports on experiments with a game 
concerning cost allocation in water resources. The ultimate purpose of 
the  game is to be an  aid in finding better methods for allocating joint 
costs in projects when several parties, e.g., municipalities, join together 
t o  save costs by building a larger facility instead of several smaller ones. 
Gaming, ' that is, the  actual playing of games, is seen here as a com- 
plement to other, more deductive, methods, mainly based on game 
theory. Since the idea is that the planners involved shall really want to 
use the allocation scheme, it is important that the scheme is congruent 
with the planner's own thinking. Gaming can first of all be used as an 
"acid test" of the proposed game theoretic suggestion. If some theory is 
not appealing in an experimental setting, it is more likely not so in real 
application either. Furthermore, gaming can be seen as a direct way of 
finding out what ideas of distribution are really held by planners. 
The experiments reported on in this working paper were carried out 
in Poland and Bulgaria. Together with earlier experiments in Sweden and 
Italy, they were also intended t o  give some indication of whether planners 
in different countries are similar enough that it is reasonable t o  move 
models or methodology from one country to another and from one 
economic system to another. The experiments could in this regard have 
specific relevance for the IIASA Regional Development Task, where similar 
planning approaches are  applied to regions in the four countries men- 
tioned above. 
Thls paper reviews six gaming experiments with a game on cost allo- 
cation in water resources, carried out with water planners, scientists and 
advanced students in Poland and Bulgaria. 
The results are similar to those obtained from the games played in 
Sweden and Italy. The similarity is particularly noticeable when the com- 
parison is limited to games involving planners. 
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INTRODUCTlON 
Thls paper reports on two gaming experiments in Poland and four in 
Bulgaria. These six experiments are part  of a series of experiments with 
a game concerning cost allocation in water resources. 
The following gives the background information of t h s  game 
In Sweden, six blocks of municipalities in Southwestern Skane have a 
choice of strategy as regards their long term water planning. Such a 
municipality block,+ henceforth simply called municipality, can either 
solve its water supply problem on its own, or i t  can join together with 
several municipalities, up to the grand coalition involving all six munici- 
palities. Due to "economies of scale", there are  in most cases cost sav- 
ings when municipalities join together and the grand coalition leads to 
the lowest total costs. 
The question is now, how costs should be allocated. The cost alloca- 
tion problem arises from the fact tha t  the fixed costs of construction of 
the plant cannot be assigned to the municipalities in any obviously unique 
way. One can only propose various principles on w h c h  such allocation 
should depend and on the basis of these principles formulate methods for 
allocating these costs. 
*Aitho-.qh in reality there are 18 municipalities in this region, i t  was found practical and real- 
istic to group these into six units which for t-his purpose cen be regarded as acting as in- 
dependent municipalities. 
Young, Okada, Hashimoto (1980), analyzed seven different methods: 
1. Allocation in proportion to population 
2 .  Allocation in proportion to demand 
3. The SCRB-method (separable costs--remaining benefits), a 
method used in practice 
4. The Shapley Value, a well-known game theoretic method, based 
on the principle that the parties join a coalition one after the 
other 
5. The Ordinary Nucleolus 
6. The Weak Nucleolus 
7. The Proportional Nucleolus 
The three Nucleoli-methods all lead to a solution in what is called the 
core, implying that they fulfill the two principles of Individual and Group 
rationality. 
Individual rationality implies that the allocation of the costs of the 
grand coalition is such that  no municipality should be better off going 
alone. 
Group rationality implies that  the sum of payments made by the 
members of every coalition wbch  is smaller than the grand coalition 
should not be larger than the cost that this coalition incurs if it is worhng 
on its own, i. e . ,  no group of municipalities shall have an  incentive to leave 
the grand coalition and form a smaller one. 
Regarding these two principles as important and notug that only 
these core methods fulfil.1 these principles in t h s  game, Young makes the 
final choice between these three core methods. For this he uses two 
other principles. "If there is a cost overrun, no party shall pay less", and 
"a player who never contributes t o  any costs savings when joining with 
other parties or coalitions should not realize any cost savings above his go 
alone costs". The Proportional Nucleolus is suggested because it is the 
only one of the three core methods which always fulfills the  principles. 
The question now is if water planners really want to use t h s  method. 
Is the allocation scheme congruent with the planners' mode of thinking? 
In this connection gaming can be seen as an "acid test" of the proposed 
game theoretic model. If a theory is not appealing in an experimental 
setting, i t  is most likely not so in real application either. Furthermore, 
gaming ca n  be used as a direct way of finding out what ideas of distribu- 
tion are really held by planners: How do intelligent decision makers, 
arrive a t  a compromise between different concepts, such as efficiency 
and equity, in negotiations of this type? 
With these questions in mind we ran our first gaming experiment with 
water planners in Skane in November 1979. This experiment is reported 
on in IIASA WP-00-30. The game was then repeated in April 1980 with 
regional planners in Tuscany, Italy. Ths is reported on in WP-80-82. 
Although the negotiation process was quite different in the two countries 
as regards the amount of verbal  communication, the  actual results were 
very close. In fact, if one used the outcome in t h e  Swedish game as a 
method for predicting the outcome in Italy it would have been a far better  
predictor than anyone of the seven methods above. 
This then raised the question of whether this similarity in results 
obtained in two countries was coincidental. To answer this question, more 
international gaming comparisons were needed. 
I t  was especially interesting to see if similar results could be 
obtained in countries with different economic systems to the market 
economies of Sweden and Italy such as  in the  socialist countries. 
The IIASA Regional Development Task carries out case studies in 
Poland, Bulgaria, Italy and Sweden. For this reason Poland and Bulgaria 
were the natural choice amongst the Socialist countries to continue our 
study.# 
Since similar model elements were planned to  be used in these case 
studies, the question then naturally arose to what extent was there 
enough similarity in behavior to warrant the use of similar methodologies 
in these countries. Also of interest was the water cost allocation problem. 
The Swedish case is closely connected to the original water problem. The 
water supply problem is of importance in the regions of the Polish and 
Bulgarian case studies. 
The games in Sweden and Italy were played with planners in the 
regions studied by IIASA; Skane and Tuscany. For practical reasons we 
could not play the games in Notec and Silistra w h c h  are the regions 
covered by the case studies in Poland and a Bulgaria. It was namely of 
paramount importance to  have a Polish and Bulgarian gamer with local 
knowledge who could organize the games. Thus R.  Wasniowski (RW) from 
the Forecasting Research Center of the Technical University of Wroclaw 
organized the game playing in Wroclaw, Poland, while I .  Assa (IA) from the 
Institute of Social Management but on secondment to IlASA organized the 
game in Sofia, Bulgaria. 
The games played in Poland and Bulgaria were virtually identical to 
that  played in Italy and thus very similar to that  played in Sweden.* The 
Italian game is presented in detail in MiP-80-82, therefore we shall only 
outline the main points of the game. 
There are six players. Each player is the  representative of one of the 
six municipalities: A ,  H,  K, L, M or T.  The players are seated around a 
small table. Each player has a sheet of paper showing the costs of every 
conceivable coalition, such as table 1. On the basis of this table the out- 
come according to the &fferent methods has been computed in table 2. 
Each municipality can now enter  into a coalition with some other 
municipality or municipalities. When forming a coalition, the players 
reach a n  agreement on how much each of the participants in the formed 
coalition shall pay of the total costs of the whole coalition. As soon as a 
coalition has been formed and an agreement has been reached as  to  the 
allocation of the total costs of t h s  coalition among its members, they 
register the coalition with the game leader. He will record the coalition 
participants, as  well as  the payment each of them would make toward the 
total costs of the coalition. 
#Further information on this task cm be found in Snicke-s 1801. 
*lor  details on how the games differed see pp.6 and 8. 
Table 1. Total cost of each possible coalition. 
AHK 
AHL 
AHM 
AHT 
AKL 
AKM 
AKT 
ALM 
ALT 
AMT 
HKL 
HKM 
HKT 
HLM 
HLT 
HMT 
KLM 
KLT 
KMT 
LMT 
AHKL 
AHKM 
AHKT 
AHLM 
AHLT 
AHMT 
AKLM 
AKLT 
ALMT 
HKLM 
HKLT 
HKMT 
HLMT 
KLMT 
AKMT 
AHKLM 
AHKMT 
AHLMT 
AHKLT 
AKLMT 
HKLMT 
AHKLMT 
Table 2 :  Allocations in Millions of Swedish Crowns 
Population Proportional 10.13 21.00 3.19 8.22 34.22 7.07 
Demand Proportional 13.07 16.01 7 . 3 0  6.87 28.48 12.08 
SCRB 19.54 13.28 5.62 10.90 16.66 17.82 
Shapley Value 20.01 10.71 6.61 10.37 16.94 19.18 
Nucleolus 20.35 12.06 5.00 8.61 18.32 19.49 
Weak Nucleolus 20.03 12.52 3.94 9.07 18.54 19 .71  
Proportional Nucleolus 20.36 1 2 . 4 6  3 .52  8.67 18.82 19.99 
A coalition does not come into force, however, until 15 minutes has 
elapsed since its registration, and then, only provided that  none of its 
members has been registered in another coalition durirg this period. 
Hence a player can leave one coalition and join another in order to  
decrease the amount of his payment. Furthermore, a coalition dissolves 
by registering a new coalition with additional members. 
The game continues until all participants are members of a coalition 
which has come into force (with the possible exception of a single "left- 
over" participant). After 90 minutes from the time of its s tar t ,  it will 
nevertheless be brought to an end and the coalitions registered but not 
broken, will come into force. 
We shall next proceed to report on the individual games: those in 
Poland in the next section, and those in Bulgaria in section after and in 
the final section we shall compare the outcome of these games with the 
outcome of the  games in Sweden and Italy as well as with the theoretical 
methods. 
THE 'IT0 GAMES IN POLAND 
Background 
RW made contact with managers a t  the Wroclaw Water Works. Their 
initial attitude to  a game of this type was somewhat sceptical, since the 
game was not regarded as adequate to Polish conditions involving 
hierarchical structures of decision making, i.e., with subsystems subject 
to a controlling organ. Hence our original plans were that  one would play 
two games in Wroclaw: the original game with scientists and doctoral stu- 
dents and a revised version of the game, more adapted to the centralized 
decision making in Po!and, with the water planners. During our period of 
planning for the game, the Polish government announced changes in the 
organization of the economic system, aiming at  increasing the indepen- 
dence of the enterprises. After thls the attitude of the water managers 
changed somewhat and it was also considered possible to play the original 
version with the water planners. Hence we planned two games for 20 Sep- 
tember 1981, one with water managers, and one with scientists and doc- 
toral students. Only three of the invited water planners could come on 
that  day; therefore, only the game with the researchers took place. The 
game with the water planners was played on 20 October 1900 instead and 
then handled only by RW. 
Same with Scientists 
The first game in Wroclaw was hence a game with six scientists and 
doctoral students a t  the Technical University of Wroclaw. The scientists 
were connected with the Forecasting Research Institute. One had been 
engaged in research on another game in Poland dealing with local plan- 
ning. Both the scientists and the doctoral students had fairly solid back- 
grounds in quantitative methods. 
The same seating arrangement was used as in the earlier games. The 
players were randomly assigned to a municipality role. The same instruc- 
tions were used as in Italy, with the exception that we, for administrative 
reasons only, gave a prize (a bottle of good brandy) to the best player and 
not as in Italy a small amount of real money t o  each player in proportion 
to the amount of fictitious money saved in the game. The instructions 
had furthermore been translated into Polish. 
After a brief introduction to the game, not requiring any special 
comments, the game started. 
After only three minutes the two party coalition HL was formed with 
11.90 to L and 13.10 to H. The total savings of 7.96 were divided equally. 
After 15 minutes from the s tar t  the coalition HKL was formed with H 
getting 10.54, K 6.38 and L 10.34. This division implies that compared t o  
the one party coalition costs, H saves 6.54, K 4.54 and L 5.54. K thus got 2 
less than H because he is the party joining the coalition. 
After another 7 minutes the remaining three players A, M and T 
formed a coalition with 20.50 to A, 20.46 to  M and 20.40 to T. The idea 
behind t h s  division was that  each one should get roughly the same cost 
and that  the figures should be rounded off. 
After another 15 minutes, i.e., after 37 minutes from the start,  the  
grand coalition AHKLMT was formed with 19.02 to A, 10.54 to H, 5.98 to  K, 
9.94 to L, 19.78 to  M and 18.56 to  T. The ideas behnd  this division were as 
follows: First, an agreement was reached on the concept that the coali- 
tion AMT should receive the major part since their costs would still be 
higher than those of HKL. Hence out of the total savings of 4.8, AMT got 4 
and HKL 0.8. HKL divided their 0.8 into two parts  of 0.4, going t o  K and L. 
on the grounds that H got such a big part  of the savings in the preceding 
coalition formation step. The savings of 4 going to mT were divided in a 
more complicated fashion with A getting 1.44, M 0.62 and T 1.94. The 
main idea behind this was that the party with the hghe r  water demand-- 
M--should get the smallest savings and thus relatively hghest  costs, while 
the party with the lowest water demand of the three-T--should get the 
greatest savings and thus comparatively lower costs. 
It should be noted that  the result was in the core. Furthermore it 
should be stressed that the agreement within 37 minutes was the earliest 
agreement of all water cost allocation games played. 
Game with Water Planners 
The institutional set  up, i.e., the instructions, seating arrangement, 
prize structure etc. ,  were the same in this game as in the game with 
scientists-doctoral students. 
After initial attempts a t  dividing costs in accordance with water 
deman.d, two coalitions were formed after around fifteen minutes: 
1. AHgivingA19.69andH 15 
2. LM giving L 13 and M 18.10 
The distribution partly follows the original one-party coalition costs, but 
with one party getting a round number and the other party the rest .  
After another quarter of an  hour a three-party coalition AHL was 
formed with 17.69 to A, 13  to H and 12.53 to L. A and H each save 2 com- 
pared to  the earlier coalition, while L gets the remaining savings. 
Again after roughly a quarter of a n  hour another coalition was 
formed, the four party coalition HKLM with H obtaining 12, K 7.5, L 12 and 
h4 16.57. We see that H and L agree on equal costs and that  the principle 
of using round numbers is still used. 
This coalition was dissolved after only a few minutes by the formation 
of the coalition AHL, with 20.22 to A and 11.5 to  both H and L. Party A 
being left out in the previous coalition was now willing to  take a consider- 
able par t  of the costs in order to come into a coalition again. 
After only a few minutes this coalition was also broken with the coali- 
tion HKL being formed with 10.5 to each of H and L and 6.26 to K. H and L 
each saved 1 compared to the preceding coalition. 
Very soon afterwards M and T joined t h s  coalition to form HKLMT 
with 10 t o  H, 6 to K, 10 to L, 20.46 to  M and 20 to T. H, K and L here go 
down to the  nearest integer. 
Finally after 70 minutes from the s tar t  of the game the grand coali- 
tion AHKLMT was formed with A obtaining i8.8, H 10.39, K 5.80, L 9.42, M 
19.81 and T 19.80. T h s  division came into force a s  the final agreement. 
As regards this final division of the costs it should first of all be 
noticed tha t  this division does not lie in the  core. Group rationality is 
violated with regard to the  subcoalition MT. This subcoalition could on its 
own get away with 39.41, but  in the final division M and T together paid 
39.61. It appears that M and T were not aware of this fact. The difference 
of 0.2 is, however, so small that one cannot rule out that,  even if the 
players had been aware of this violation of group rationality, they might 
not have cared to  break up the grand coalition. 
The reasoning behind the final distribution is difficult to establish. It 
appears tha t  the exact form was the result of pure haggling. However 
every party except H got away with lower costs than he had in the previ- 
ous coalition that  he had been part  of. The reason why just H had to raise 
his costs and now pay more than L, might be dependent on the fact tha t  H 
has both a higher water demand and higher initial'costs than L. 
After the game there was a discussion with the managers. They 
stated that  the game could be a good exercise for training, e.g. coalition 
formation for the realization of joint enterprises. The managers also sug- 
gested as an  extension of the game to introduce an  additional player who 
would evaluate the behavior of the six ordinary players. They also dis- 
cussed the possible reconstruction of the game into a hierarchical two 
level game. In this, one would on the top level conduct the present game. 
On a 10"'31 level one would have a game with several players within each of 
the six "municipality teams. " 
THE FOUR G M E S  IN BULGARIA 
Background 
In October 1980. 1. Assa arranged for the playing of the games in Bul- 
garia with four teams: one with water planners, one with scientists and 
two with management students. 
All six participants in the water planners' team were engineers and 
came from the institute called "Vodproekt". The major task of this insti- 
tute is to work on projects for the construction of water nets in Bulgaria 
(irrigation, dams, pumping stations etc.) They are also taking part  in the 
Silistra case study and are involved in the implementation of IIASA water 
models in Bulgaria. Th,eir ages range from 40-45. 
Three of the participants in the scientists team were from the Insti- 
tute for Social Management; two were mathematicians and one a statisti- 
cian. All are lecturers and work in the department of Quantitative 
Methods and Modeling in Social Management. 
Two of the other participants are economists from the Economic 
Management Center of the Academy for Social Sciences in Sofia, and lec- 
ture in the department of Management of the Industry Sectors. The 
final participant works in the laboratory of Economic Modeling at  the 
Institute of Economics of the Bulgarian Academy of Science. The age of 
these scientists is between 30-40. 
All twelve participants on the management students' team, aged 
between 25-35, have a university degree in engineering and/or econom- 
ics. At present they are following a two year course in management lead- 
ing to a degree similar to an M.Sc. In this program they are  trained to 
become managers in different enterprises or municipalities. 
The management students divided themselves into two teams. It 
appeared that the younger ones went to one team and the older ones to  
the other. Although the age difference was not so very great, we shall for 
the sake of simplicity refer to the two teams as young management stu- 
dents and old management students. It is probable that  the participants 
in the latter team had more practical experience than the members of 
the former team. 
The game played was identical to that  played in Poland with two 
minor differences: A prize was given only tc, the "best" player of all four 
teams, while in Poland, where the game -;:as played with the two teams on 
two separate occasions, a prize was given to the best in each team. How- 
ever, it was thought that by not giving a prize to one in each team, intra- 
team competition might be lower. Furthermore, while i n  Poland, just as 
in Italy, information was given only on the water demand for each munici- 
pality, in Bulgaria we also gave information on the population of each 
municipality. By doing s o  we could, in our total series of experiments 
havr roughly half of the games with only demand information and half 
with both populati.on and demand information. It appears, however, that  
the addition of information regarding population does not play any part  in 
*It should also be mentioned that prior t o  playing the games in Poland and Bulgaria we had 
also played the game five times with young scientists and dociord students visiting U S A .  
This is reported on in WP-80-134 and WP-8 1-21. 
influencing the actual outcome of itself 
Game with Water Planners 
In their negotiations the water planners started by trying to form as 
large a coalition as possible directly and they discussed basing the divi- 
sion on either population or water demand. These efforts failed, since 
these methods would mean that  individual municipalities, like M, would 
have to pay more than their go alone costs. 
Next the discussions were directed towards the formation of one 
coalition HKLM and one coalition AT. The water planners realized, how- 
ever, that  K does not contribute any cost savings. Hence H, K and L 
instead formed a temporary coalition, which was not formally registered 
with the game leader. The costs of this coalition were then distributed 
according to the go alone costs of H, K and L implying 10.63 for H, 6.82 for 
K and 9.81 for L. T h s  also became the payments of these parties in the 
grand coalition, which was next formed. The planners agreed that this 
' was favorable enough, in comparison to the go-alone costs, for these par- 
ties. The remaining costs 83.82 - 27.26 = 56.56 were then divided among 
AMT in proportion to  the go alone costs of these three parties, implying a 
cost of 19.23 at  A, 18.10 to  M and 19.23 for T. PA agreement on this divi- 
sion was registered after 63 minutes from the start .  
It should be noted that this solution does not violate the core con- 
cept. It is exactly on the boundary line of the core, since H,K and L, as 
noted above, can get  the same cost sum 27.26 by forming the three party 
coalition HKL. Since, as noted above, the core concept was violated in the 
other three games, the prize in Bulgaria was given to  the water planners. 
Game with Scientists 
After 21 minutes H and L in the scientists group formed a coalition 
with 12.95 to H and 12.05 to L. Thls division implies that  the parties 
divided the costs in direct proportion to their go alone costs. 
After 51 minutes from the s tar t  a four party coalition HKLM was 
formed with 12.69 to H, 0.11 to K, 11.80 to L and 15.47 to M. Here the 
costs of the coalition HKLM were allocat.ed to the members in proportion 
to their go-alone costs. Two thngs  here are noteworthy. Contrary to the 
planners, the scientists did not seem to notice that player M did not con- 
tribute to any cost savings and that H ,  k' and L would have been better off 
by only forming the three party coalition HKL. Secondly, the allocation of 
costs were based on the parties go alone costs. H and L would have been 
better  off, if their shares of the costs i.nstead had been based on the costs 
they obtained in the two party coalition HL, which had just been formed. 
Finally, after 67 minutes from the s tar t ,  the grand coalition AHKLMT 
was formed with A: 17.87, H: 12.56, K: 8.10, L: 11.80, M: 15.40, and T: 
17.99.* This solution does not lie in the core. H, K and L, for example 
together pay 32.46, i.e, more than the cost of 27.26 of the coalition AHkZ. 
*It should be noted that this totals 83.72 inslead of 83.82. 
Game with Young Management Students 
After 38 minutes from the start  H and K registered a coalition HK 
with H: 15.05 and K: 7.91. Of the total savings of 5.03 compared to the 
parties go alone costs, H got 2.03 and K 3. Here we could not establish 
any other principle than one party getting a round number of savings. 
The fact that K got a considerably larger part of the savings than H could 
possibly be due to the fact of K having a lower water demand. 
Next, after 55 minutes from the s tar t  an at tempt was made to  form 
the coalition AHKL, with 16.79 to A, i4.08 to H ,  10.91 to K and 7.17 to L. 
Here the costs were said to be divided partly in accordance with water 
demand. K, realizing that this division w ~ u l d  give him far less than the 
just registered coalition HK, refused to join. Instead, after 61 minutes 
from the  s tar t  an other coalition AHKL was registered with A: 16.79, H: 
14.08, K: 7.90 and L: 10.18. Thus A and H kept their costs unchanged, K 
reduced his share, so it would be profitable for him to leave the coalition 
HK, while L absorbed the whole decrease in K's costs. 
Finally, after 66 minutes from the start ,  h h n d  T formed a two party 
coalition with 18.91 to M and 19.50 for T.* This is roughly in proportion to 
their going alone costs. 
After this agreement, the parties after a while broke up the negotia- 
tions, when they realized that  the planners and scientists had already fin- 
ished. Thus, the young management students did not form the grand 
c~al i t ion.  The two coalitions AHL and MT together pay 88.36, that is 4.54 
more than the grand coalition. The prize structure of the game (see page 
8) might partly have caused this failure to agree on total minimum costs. 
Since the grand coalition was not formed, the solution is obviously not in 
the core. 
Game with Old Management Students 
The "old" management students started to  discuss a division on the 
basis of water demand. First they tried to form the five party coalition 
AHKLT leaving K out probably due to the problem that  a six party alloca- 
tion based on demand would give M much higher costs than he would get 
if he played alone. 
After 45 minutes from the start  they were, however, trying to form a 
four party coalition HKLM for the division. They used the foll.owing pro- 
cedure: 
Looking at water demand, they saw that  L has the lowest 
demand and regarded his demand of 3.53 as one "standardized 
demand unit". Next they divided the costs of H, K, L and M by 
3.53, obtaining coefficients 2.33, i.06, 1 and 4.15 respectively, 
i.e., a sum of 8.54 standardized demand units. Next the  total 
costs of HKLM, i .e. ,  48.07, were divided by 8.54 giving a cost of 
5.62 per standardized demand. unit. Then they assigned a cost 
of 5.62 to each standardized demand unit. 
*This involves an error by adding up to 38.41 instead of 30.4 1. 
This seemingly complicated procedure simply implied that  the costs 
of HKLM were distributed in direct proportion to the water demand of 
each party. This led to a division H 13.09, K 5.96, L 5.62 and M 23.32. At 
the  last minute M quit t h s  coalition at tempt realizing tha t  he would be 
better  off alone. 
Next H, K and L proceeded to form a coalition. Finding tha t  L had a 
large population, in relation to its water demand, H and K started to insist 
on L taking a larger par t  of the cost. After some bargaining not based on 
specific principles, HKL arrived a t  a distribution H 13.50, K 5.50 and L 
8.26. The basis for H's and K's payments seemed to be the earlier 
at tempted distribution giving H 13.09 and K 5.96; H with a relatively large 
population going up to the nearest round 0.5 and K with a relatively low 
population going down to the nearest round 0.5. L finally paid the remain- 
ing 8.26. This coalition was registered after 59 minutes from the  start .  
After t h s ,  at tempts continued to form a larger coalition involving A, 
M and T. These three parties did not, however, on their own try to  form a 
separate coalition. After another 15 minutes H, K and L did not regard it 
as worthwhile to continue the negotiations so the coalition H, K and L 
came into force. 
A, M and T then also wanted to quit, remaining as one party coali- 
tions. These decisions to quit were made after the groups with water 
planners and scientists had discontinued the game, having formed grand 
coalitions. 
In this context it  should be noted that the coalitions AM and AT are  
meaningless since they do not lead to any cost savings. The same applies 
to AMT, if MT has been formed. Hence the only possible meaningful coali- 
tion remaining for these three was MT. A division of the costs of the coali- 
tion MT in proportion to either population or  demand would, however, 
have violated individual rationality for K. A strong focus on allocating the 
costs according to either demand or population, combined with a lack of 
interest,  due to the prize structure of the game (see p.8), appears to  
explain why, for example, the coalition MT was not formed a t  this point. 
Since the grand coalition was not formed the  solution is obviously not 
in the  core. 
COMPARISONS BETWEEN RES'ULTS AND METHODS 
We s ta r t  by summing up all the experimental results of the six games 
in table 3, which can then be compared with the suggested outcome 
according to the various methods in table 2. 
In order to see how well the theoretical allocations fit these experi- 
mental values, we use three measures of difference: 
1. The sum of absolute differences. With T as the theoretical value 
and E as the experimental value the measure is: 
- 1 2 -  
T a b l e  3. Summary o f  o u t c o m e s  o f  e x p e r i m e n t s  
GAME A 
P o l i s h  s c i e n t i s t s  1 9 . 0 2  
P o l i s h  W a t e r  P l a n n e r s  1 8 . 8 0  
B u l g a r i a n  Water P l a n n e r s  1 9 . 2 3  
B u l g a r i a n  S c i e n t i s t s  1 7 . 8 7  
B u l g a r i a n  "Young" S c i e n t i s t s  1 6 . 7 9  
B u l g a r i a n  " O l d "  S c i e n t i s t s  2 1 . 9 5  
L 
P o l i s h  s c i e n t i s t s  9 . 9 4  
P o l i s h  W a t e r  P l a n n e r s  9 . 4 2  
B u l g a r i a n  Water P l a n n e r s  9 . 8 1  
B u l g a r i a n  S c i e n t i s t s  1 1 . 8 0  
B u l g a r i a n  "Young" S c i e n t i s t s  1 0 . 1 8  
B u l g a r i a n  " O l d "  S c i e n t i s t s  8 . 2 6  
2 The sum of the squared differences, i.e, 
Compared to measure 1, t h s  gives a hghe r  relative weight to 
large discrepancies. 
3 The sum of the  relative squared differences, i .e,  of the squared 
differences after dividing each difference by the theoretical 
value, i .e. ,  
The idea behind t h s  measure is that  a difference is more impor- 
tant  if it is relatively large in comparison with the "expected" 
value. 
As an additional method of forecasting the outcome of each game we also 
include the result of the original game played in Skane with Swedish 
water planners. We then obtain the results presented in tables 4-9 below. 
Comparing tables 4-9, we find the following common traits in all six 
games: 
1. Cost allocation in proportion to population is the worse predic- 
tion method. 
2. Allocation in proportion to water demand is the second worse 
prediction method. 
3. The Nucleolus is a bet ter  predictor than the Proportional 
Nucleolus. 
It should be stressed that  these three conclusions have also held in all 
earlier games. 
Besides these three conclusions holding for all six games, the results 
seem to differ. It here appears suitable to divide the games into two 
groups: one group consisting of the two Polish games and the game with 
the Bulgarian water planners; the other group consisting of the other 
three Bulgarian games. 
In the  first group the Swedish game, the Shapley Value and the 
Nucleolus were the three best predictors, with the Weak Nucleolus on the 
fourth place. The results were thus very similar to those obtained, not 
only in Sweden, but also in Italy and in the games with international 
groups of scientists a t  IIAS.4, (see MTP-81-21). 
For the second group the Swedish game was not such a good predic- 
tor while the SCRB did quite well, a t  least in two of the games. It is furth- 
ermore noteworthy that the difference measure values were much h g h e r  
in t h s  group than in the first. The results of the second group were 
more like those of two games played with Swedish doctoral students a t  
IIASA (see WP-80-134). 
One can thus, incorporating the earlier games,  distinguish for exam- 
ple between one group of games involving planners with similar results 
and one with students. One might in this connection ask vrhy there was 
such a difference in results between the planners and the students. Some 
possible explanations come to mind: 
Firstly, planners might be less motivated by prizes than students and 
out of professional pride at tempt to make as good a job as possible 
without thinking of the prize structure of the game.  As mentioned above, 
par t  of the  discrepancy of the result as regards the Bulgarian manage- 
ment students might have been influenced by the prize structure, rnaki.ng 
the students a t  the end of the game less interested in continuing to 
at tempt to form the grand coalition. 
Secondly, the planners are  more likely to have thought about these 
types of cost allocation problems earlier. They are also more likely to 
have a more clear conception of what kind of goals and principles apply in 
a real situation. 
In general it appeared in the games both with the Swedish doctoral 
students and the Bulgarian Management Students, that  students would be 
somewhat less prone to defend the interests of their own municipality 
than the planners. 
Finally, planners appeared to be more efficient in their use of time 
and spend more time on trying to  form coalitions and on discussing gen- 
eral principles, whle students would spend more time calculating specific 
cost divisions. (See WP-80-134.) 
The most interesting result from the playing of the game in Poland 
and Bulgaria is the similarity in outcome between the games played with 
planners in Sweden, Italy, Poland and Bulgaria. Although it must be 
stressed that we have results from only four games and that  behavior in a 
game might very well be different from behavior in real life, the result is 
encouraging. I t  is a t  least not contradicting the hypothesis that  planners 
in different countries and different systems are similar enough that it is 
reasonable to at tempt to use similar types of planning models in different 
countries. 
Table 4. Polish Scientists 
Difference measures 
1 2 3 
Swedish Game 
Shapley Value 
Nucleolus 
Weak Nucleolus 
SCRB 
Proportional Nucleo~lus 
Water Demand 
Population 
Table 5. Polish Water Planners 
Difference measures 
1 2 3 
Swedish Game 
Nucleolus 
Shapley Value 
Weak Nucleolus 
Proportional Nucleolus 
SCRB 
Water Demand 
Population 
Table 6. Bulgarian Water Planners 
Difference measures 
1 2 3 
Shapley Value 
Swedish Game 
Nucleolus 
Weak Nucleolus 
SCRB 
Proportional Nucleolus 
Water Demand 
Population 
Table 7. Bulgarian Scientists 
Difference measures 
1  2  3  
SCRB 
Shapley Value 
Nucleolus 
Weak Nucleolus 13.95 42 .24  6.13 
Swedish Game 15 .42  41 .74  3.49 
Proportional Nucleolus 15.72 52 .69  8 .22  
Water Demand 32.97  2 6 5 . 9 0  15 .03  
Population 54.41  641 .50  45.64 
Table 8. Bulgarian "Young" Management Students 
Difference measures 
1  2  3  
SCRB 
Shapley Value 
Nucleolus 
Weak Nucleolus 
Proportional Nucleolus 
Swedish Game 
Water Demand 
Population 
Table 9. Bulgarian "Old" Management Students 
Difference measures 
1  2  3  
Nucleolus 8 .87  17.U1 1 . 0 2  
Proportional Nucleolus 9 . 0 0  15 .62  1 . 7 5  
Weak Nucleolus 9 . 8 1  1 8 . 0 4  1 .49  
Swedish Game 10 .16  28 .14  2.28 
Shapley Value 
SCRB 
Water Demand 
Population 4 9 . 9 9  603 .44  59 .89  
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